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I Introduction
Recent empirical research using firm-level survey data (Bloom and Van Reenen
2007, 2010) has substantiated the existence of large variation in management
practices across countries and the importance of management quality for firm
performance.1 In particular, Bloom et al. (2013) documented that improv-
ing management quality has positive impact on firm productivity and survival.
Among various types of management practices defined by Bloom and Van Reenen
(2007), how well a firm monitors its workers is one important category. The
research question I ask in this paper is that whether improving management
quality (i.e., monitoring efficiency) at the economy level (for all firms) benefits
every firm after we take into account general equilibrium effects. Moreover,
does this aggregate-level improvement necessarily lead to an improvement in
welfare and total output? This paper shows that aggregate improvement in man-
agement quality triggers a selection effect which favors more hierarchical (i.e.,
more layers) firms. As a result, less hierarchical firms shrink or exit the market.
Moreover, if this selection effect is strong enough, an aggregate improvement in
management quality leads to an improvement in welfare and total output.
This paper focuses on a particular type of management technology (i.e.,
management quality): the ability to monitor and punish misbehaving employ-
ees. In what follows, I use MT to denote how effectively the firm monitors and
punishes misbehaving workers. I focus on this, as it is an important component
of overall management technology and affects firm performance substantially.2
In order to focus on monitoring activities of the firm and make the model ana-
lytically tractable, I adopt a monitoring-based hierarchy model and incorporate
it into an industry equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms (i.e., a closed
economy version of Melitz 2003). I treat institutional quality (e.g., labor market
conditions and levels of business education) as exogenous from the perspec-
tive of a firm, but allow firms to make choices about their internal organization
subject to the institution. As a result, how well a firm monitors and punishes
misbehaving workers is affected by both the institution and the firm’s organiza-
tional choices.
This article develops an industry equilibrium model with two sectors. One
1See Bloom and Van Reenen (2007, 2010), Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2012), and
Bloom et al. (2013) for details.
2Evidence can be found in Bloom and Van Reenen (2007, 2010).
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sector is a homogeneous sector which is a perfectly competitive sector with a
constant returns to scale technology. I assume that there are no incentive issues
inside firms of this sector for simplicity. The other sector which is the main
focus of my analysis is a monopolistically competitive sector (the CES sector
henceforth). It comprises a continuum of differentiated products with a constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) à la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).3 The demand
for these products varies depending on their individual characteristics. An en-
trepreneur can enter this sector by paying a fixed cost, and then she receives a
random draw of demand (i.e., quality) for her product. Once the entrepreneur
observes the quality, she decides whether or not to stay in the market as there is
a fixed cost to produce as well. In equilibrium, entrepreneurs in the CES sector
earn an expected payoff which equals their exogenous outside option due to free
entry.
Firms in the CES sector need to incentivize employees through monitoring,
as production requires both time and effort, and the latter is costly for firms to
observe. Following the canonical approach to modeling monitoring and incen-
tive problems inside the firm (i.e., Calvo and Wellisz 1978, 1979; Qian 1994;
Acemoglu and Newman 2002), I assume that the firm sets up a monitoring-
based hierarchy consisting of multiple layers. Specifically, the firm allocates
workers into different layers to make supervisors monitor their direct subordi-
nates and offer efficiency (i.e., incentive-compatible) wage contracts to workers.
In equilibrium, production workers (i.e., workers in the bottom layer) and non-
production workers are incentivized to exert effort to work.
The key result from the firm-level analysis is that firms whose products have
greater demand set up a hierarchy with more layers. In addition to output and
price, firms choose the number of layers and the span of control at each layer.4
When the firm wants to produce more, it has to increase the span of control
owing to the constraint at the top. A larger span of control implies that less
attention is paid to monitor each subordinate, which has to be compensated by
a higher wage. The firm can add a layer and reduce the span of control to save
wage payments to workers at existing layers. However, this comes at the cost
of extra wage payments to workers at the new layer. In short, adding a layer
3The purpose of having the homogeneous sector is to endogenize the welfare of workers in
a tractable way.
4The span of control is defined as the ratio of the number of subordinates to the number of
direct supervisors.
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is like an efficiency-enhancing investment with a fixed cost, which generates
endogenous increasing returns to scale at the firm level.
I then incorporate this monitoring-based hierarchy model into the closed
economy version of Melitz (2003) and evaluate the impact of an economy-wide
improvement in the efficiency of monitoring and firing shirking workers. This
improvement occurs when labor markets are deregulated, or better management
education and practices are introduced into an economy. The key insight is that
such an improvement generates a selection effect that favors big firms. An im-
provement in MT benefits all firms by reducing their labor cost. Importantly,
firms with more layers gain disproportionately from such a shock, as their av-
erage variable costs (AVCs) increase less rapidly with output (i.e., a smaller
elasticity of AVC with respect to output). They expand more, since the orga-
nizationally augmented production technology features endogenous increasing
returns to scale at the firm level. This extra expansion creates competitive pres-
sure on the smallest firms and force them to leave the market.
The selection effect of an improvement in MT yields several testable impli-
cations. First, the resulting firm size distribution moves to the right in the first-
order-stochastic-dominance (FOSD) sense, which is consistent with the finding
from Poschke (2014). This result is also consistent with the finding from Hsieh
and Klenow (2009, 2012) and Hsieh and Olken (2014) that Mexico and In-
dia, whose firms are doing worse at removing misbehaving workers, have more
small firms and fewer big firms than the U.S. Finally, surviving firms either in-
crease the number of layers or enlarge the span of control, which is consistent
with Bloom et al. (2013)’s finding.5
Firm’s heterogeneous choice about the number of layers is the key to gen-
erating the selection effect. In a hypothetical world, if all firms had the same
number of layers before MT improves and cannot change the number of layers
after MT improves, this heterogeneous impact would disappear perfectly. In
this world, all firms have the same AVC function (both before and after MT im-
proves), and a downward shift of the AVC curve (because of better MT) affects
every firm proportionately. Note that the selection effect still exists, if firms
choose the number of layers optimally before MT improves, but are not allowed
5Bloom et al. (2013) documented that Indian firms that had received free access to better MT
expanded through the establishment of new plants. This finding is consistent with my model’s
prediction, since establishing a new plant is like increasing the span of control of the firm owner
or adding an additional layer between the owner and lower-level production units.
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to change the number of layers after MT improves. This is shown in Section
IV, and the reason is that the endogenous increasing returns to scale technology
(induced by the heterogeneous choice about the number of layers) still exits in
this case. In short, fixing the number of layers at the same value (for all firms)
makes the selection effect disappear.
Although I use the monitoring-based hierarchy model to show the selec-
tion effect due to tractability, this effect is more general than being a result
of a specific hierarchy model. For instance, I conjecture that an improvement
in communication technology should generate the same selection effect in the
knowledge hierarchy model in industry equilibrium (e.g., Caliendo and Rossi-
Hansberg 2012), as firms with more layers use communication technology dis-
proportionately more. The same selection effect induced by better communi-
cation technology should also be found in management hierarchy models with
delegation in industry equilibrium (e.g., Grobovsek 2014). In short, the key in-
sight that the hierarchical structure of the firm matters for resource allocation
and market competition is a new and general lesson we can draw from the re-
search on firm hierarchies.
The aggregate improvement in MT can lead to either an increase or a de-
crease in welfare and total output, and the key determinant is the strength of the
selection effect. After an improvement in MT, firms increase the share of non-
production workers in employment in order to exploit the improved MT better,
as surviving firms add layers of non-production workers (weakly) into the hier-
archy. Although this reorganization is optimal for the firm and increases firm
profit (coming from lower efficiency wages paid to existing employees), it is
not optimal for the economy as non-production workers do not produce output.6
In fact, it is a wasteful way to allocate labor resource from the perspective of a
social planner. At the same time, thanks to the selection effect, production work-
ers are reallocated to firms with better demand draws after MT improves. As a
result, the economy is using production workers more efficiently after MT im-
proves, as more production workers are used to produce more valuable goods.
Of course, the total effect depends on which force is stronger. When market
competition is stiffer (i.e., when goods are more substitutable) in the CES sec-
6I assume non-production workers only monitor or supervise subordinates for tractability.
However, the same reasoning applies to a more general setting in which non-production workers
(e.g., white collar workers) are less involved in producing real goods.
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tor, the reallocation effect becomes stronger. Therefore, welfare and total output
increase (after MT improves) when market competition is stronger and vice
versa.
My work contributes to the literature studying internal firm organization in
the industry equilibrium framework. Existing research focuses either on the
choice between outsourcing and FDI (e.g., Antràs 2003, 2005; Antràs and Help-
man 2004; Alfaro et al. 2016) or on how market price and wealth distribution
affect firm boundary and size (Legros and Newman 2008, 2013, 2014; Conconi,
Legros, and Newman 2012; Legros, Newman, and Proto 2014). Different from
the existing research, this paper focuses on monitoring and incentivizing activ-
ities of the firm and shows how the quality of them affects resource allocation.
In addition, this paper emphasizes that the potential negative welfare implica-
tion of better monitoring technology in efficiency wage models (e.g., Acemoglu
and Newman 2002) can be mitigated or even overturned by the selection effect,
which is new to the literature.
This paper contributes to the literature on monitoring-based hierarchies (e.g.,
Calvo and Wellisz 1978, 1979; Qian 1994; Acemoglu and Newman 2002; Meagher
2003) in several ways.7 This paper is the first one that incorporates the monitoring-
based hierarchy model into the heterogeneous firm framework and solves the
market equilibrium. Then, I analyze the heterogeneous impact of improved MT
in an industry equilibrium model and uncover a selection effect, which are new
to the literature.
This paper is related to the research on knowledge-based hierarchies (e.g.,
Garicano 2000; Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg 2004, 2006, 2012; Antràs, Gari-
cano, and Rossi-Hansberg 2006; Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg 2012). A paper
that is related to mine is Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012). The key dif-
ference is that the main focus of my paper is to study how effectively firms
punish shirking workers affects resource allocation in a closed economy, while
Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) focused on how the endogenous choice
of the number of layers affects gains in aggregate productivity and welfare af-
ter trade liberalization. I.e., the selection effect of improved MT is not studied
in Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012). In addition, monitoring-based hier-
7Earlier papers on management hierarchies include those by Williamson (1967), Beckmann
(1977), and Keren and Levhari (1979) etc. Mookherjee (2013) provides a survey for this litera-
ture.
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archy model presented in this paper emphasizes the role of frictions (e.g., the
moral hazard problem) in determining firm hierarchy and aggregate economic
outcomes. I find that welfare and total output can fall after MT improves. In
contrast, welfare and aggregate output cannot fall when information and com-
mutation technology improves in the knowledge-based hierarchy model in in-
dustry equilibrium.8
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two solves the
industry equilibrium model. Sections three investigates how an improvement in
MT affects firm size and resource allocation within an industry. Section four
explains why an explicit modeling of firms’ heterogeneous choice about their
internal organization is essential for the discussion of aggregate impacts of better
MT. Section five concludes.
II An Equilibrium Model of Firm Hierarchy Based
on Monitoring
In this section, I develop a model that features firms’ endogenous selection of
a hierarchy with a specific number of layers. The key elements are the firm’s
decisions on the span of control as well as the number of layers. I subsequently
introduce the model into an equilibrium setting and solve the problem of re-
source allocation in both the product and labor markets.
II.A Environment
The economy comprises two sectors, L units of labor and N potential entrepreneurs,
where N is sufficiently large that the free entry (FE) condition discussed below
will hold with equality. One sector produces a homogeneous good and is per-
fectly competitive, while the other sector produces horizontally differentiated
goods and features monopolistic competition.
A representative agent demands goods from both sectors and has the follow-
8In the knowledge hierarchy model, the social planner’s solution for resource allocation is
the same as the resource allocation in the decentralized economy.
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ing Cobb-Douglas utility function:
(1) U =
(Cc
γ
)γ( Ch
1 − γ
)1−γ − Iψ(ai),
where Ch is the consumption of the homogeneous good and Cc is an index of
consumption of differentiated goods defined as
(2) Cc =
( ∫
Ω
θ
1
σ y(θ)
σ−1
σ Mµ(θ)dθ
) σ
σ−1
,
where y(θ) is the consumption of variety θ, and M denotes the mass of prod-
ucts available to the consumer. µ(θ) indicates the probability distribution over
the available varieties in Ω, and σ(> 1) is the constant elasticity of substitution.
Note that θ is a demand shifter for a variety produced by a firm, so agents de-
mand more of goods with higher θ at a given price. I and ψ(ai) are, respectively,
an indicator function and a disutility to exert effort that will be discussed later.
The final composite good is defined as
(3) C ≡
(Cc
γ
)γ( Ch
1 − γ
)1−γ
,
which is the first part of terms appearing in the right hand side of equation (1).
I choose the price of it to be the numeraire, so
(4) Pγp1−γh ≡ 1,
where
(5) P =
( ∫
Ω
θp(θ)1−σMµ(θ)dθ
) 1
1−σ
is the ideal price index of the differentiated goods. ph is the price of the homo-
geneous good, and p(θ) is the price of variety θ.
The homogeneous sector features no frictions, and the perfectly competitive
market structure implies that firms receive zero profit. Labor is the only factor
used in production, and the production technology implies that output equals
the number of workers employed. The price of the homogeneous good is also
the wage offered in this sector. There is no unemployment among workers who
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enter this sector in equilibrium owing to the absence of frictions.
The CES sector produces a continuum of differentiated products. The de-
mand for these products varies depending on their individual characteristics.
There is a large pool of potential entrepreneurs who have managerial ability to
set up firms in this sector. An entrepreneur can enter this sector and receive a
random draw of quality for her product after paying a fixed cost fe to design
it. Given the existence of a fixed cost f0 to produce, the entrepreneur decides
whether or not to stay in the market after she observes the draw. Both the en-
try cost and the fixed cost are paid in the form of the final composite good, as
in Atkeson and Burstein (2010). The entrepreneur has to employ workers and
organize the production process, if she decides to produce.
Workers choose the sector in which they seek employment, while entrepreneurs
choose whether or not to operate a firm. Both types of agents are risk neutral.
In equilibrium, workers’ expected payoff obtained from entering both sectors
must be the same since they can freely move between sectors. I normalize the
outside option of an entrepreneur to zero. As a result, the expected payoff of
entrepreneurs who choose to enter the CES sector equals their entry cost (i.e.,
fe) due to free entry of firms in equilibrium.
II.B The Organization of Production
I follow the literature on monitoring-based hierarchies (i.e., Calvo and Wellisz
1978; Qian 1994; Acemoglu and Newman 2002) in modeling the organization
of production. Specifically, I assume that each firm has to employ workers at
various layers and incentivize them to exert effort in order to produce. Produc-
tion workers only produce output, while non-production workers only monitor
their direct subordinates in order to incentivize them to work.
Production requires effort and time of workers. The worker’s effort choice
ai is assumed to be a binary variable between working and shirking (i.e., ai ∈
{0, 1}) for reasons of tractability. The input of workers’ time equals the number
of workers. Production workers produce output, and shirking results in defective
output that cannot be sold. Thus, the production function is
(6) q =
∫ mT
0
a( j)d j,
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where mT is the measure of production workers and a( j) is the effort level of
the j-th unit of labor inputs. Following the convention (i.e., Calvo and Wellisz
1978; Qian 1994), I use a smaller i to denote a higher layer. As a result, the
entrepreneur is at layer zero, and workers at layer i monitor their direct subor-
dinates at layer i + 1 and need to be monitored by supervisors at layer i − 1 as
well. Layer T is the lowest layer in the hierarchy and is occupied by production
workers.
Workers must be monitored if the firm wants them to exert effort. The firm
cannot fire a shirking worker unless it is able to detect his misbehavior. A worker
at layer i is induced to work for wage wi, if and only if
(7) wi − ψ ≥ (1 − pi)wi,
where pi(≤ 1) is the probability of catching and firing a shirking worker, and ψ
is the disutility of exerting effort. Following Calvo and Wellisz (1978, 1979), I
assume that when the worker is caught shirking and gets fired, he loses the job
and receives zero wage (and payoff). A worker’s utility differs from the utility
of consuming goods only when he works in the CES sector and exerts effort in
the production process (i.e., I = 1 in equation (1)). The above inequality is the
incentive compatibility constraint that the payoff obtained from exerting effort
must be greater than or equal to that of shirking.
The probability of catching and firing a shirking worker depends on two fac-
tors: the adjusted span of control and MT.9 First, the bigger the adjusted span of
control, the less frequently a subordinate’s behavior is checked by his supervi-
sor. This implies a lower probability of catching a shirking worker. Second, MT
affects the probability of detecting workers’ misbehavior. Better management
rules or help from consulting firms on monitoring activities (e.g., free consult-
ing as in Bloom et al. 2013) lead to easier detection of workers’ misbehavior.
Finally, MT also affects the probability of successfully firing shirking workers.
Firms that are located in economies with either rigid labor markets or weak law
enforcement are found to be worse at using good management rules to remove
poor performers (Bloom and Van Reenen (2010)).10 I capture these effects by
9The adjusted span of control is the ratio of the number of subordinates to the total input of
monitoring effort exerted by the direct supervisors. Formally, it equals mi/
( ∫ mi−1
0 a( j)d j
)
where
mi is the number of workers at layer i.
10Physical technologies such as information and communication technology also affect the
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assuming the following functional form for p(b, xi):
(8) p(b, xi) = min
{
1,
1
bxi(θ)
}
,
where xi(θ) ≡ mi(θ)/
∫ mi−1
0
a( j)d j is the span of control adjusted by supervisors’
effort inputs.11 Parameter 1/b reflects the efficiency of MT. More specifically,
the worse the MT is, the bigger the value of b is. In what follows, we assume
that MT is not too efficient (i.e., b is not too small) in the sense that
p(b, xi) =
1
bxi(θ)
.
In the last section of the paper, I consider an alternative case in which monitoring
is costless and b = 0.
A firm may want to hire non-production workers, since it wants to econ-
omize on the cost to incentivize workers. Consider firm A that receives a low
demand draw θA and wants to produce two units of goods as illustrated in Figure
1. The span of control of the entrepreneur is small for this firm, which implies a
low incentive-compatible wage and justifies the use of production workers only.
Next, consider firm B that receives a high demand draw θB and wants to produce
six units of goods, which is illustrated in Figure 2. The incentive-compatible
wage paid to production workers would be too high without the addition of
non-production workers. If the firm hires non-production workers who monitor
production workers, the incentive-compatible wage paid to production workers
will be reduced. However, this comes at the cost of extra wage payment to non-
production workers. Therefore, it is optimal for the firm to add non-production
workers only when the output level is high. In total, the trade-off between pay-
ing higher wages to existing workers and paying extra wages to workers at new
layer(s) determines the optimal choice of the number of layers.
I characterize two optimal choices of the firm before solving the firm’s opti-
mal decisions on the other variables, as these two choices are independent of the
probability of detecting workers’ misbehavior (e.g., better video surveillance and e-mail scan-
ning). This can be captured by the quality of MT, 1/b, as well.
11As will be shown, the entrepreneur allocates the monitoring intensities evenly across work-
ers at the same layer. A more flexible functional form is p(b, xi) = 1bxi(θ)ν where ν can be different
from one. Allowing ν to differ from one does not affect qualitative results of the paper. Detailed
discussions are available upon request.
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Figure 1: A Firm with Two Layers
Figure 2: A Firm with Three Layers
firm’s decisions on the other variables. Lemma 1 summarizes the above results.
Lemma 1. The firm incentivizes all workers to work (i.e., ai = 1) and equalizes
the monitoring intensity across workers at a given layer.
Proof. See Appendix A.A. 
The entrepreneur faces the same incentive problem as her employees. She
sits at the top of the hierarchy and is monitored by nobody. However, the en-
trepreneur that stays in the market is incentivized to exert effort in equilibrium,
since her shirking would cause all her subordinates to shirk, which leads to a
negative profit (and payoff) to the firm.
Now I characterize the firm’s optimization problem. By substituting equa-
tion (8) into inequality (7), I derive the minimum incentive-compatible wage for
layer i as follows:
(9) wi(θ) =
ψ
pi(b, xi(θ))
= ψbxi.
The key feature of the above equation is that the minimum incentive compatible
wage wi(θ) is negatively related to the supervision intensity. This relationship
11
finds support in the data; see, for example, Rebitzer (1995) and Groshen and
Krueger (1990).12 Based on equations (1), (6), (9) and Lemma 1, the optimiza-
tion problem for a firm choosing to stay in the market can be stated as
max{mi}Ti=1,T Aθ
1
σ m
σ−1
σ
T −
T∑
i=1
bψmixi(10)
s.t. xi =
mi
mi−1
,
m0 = 1.
where the first part of the above equation is the firm’s revenue and the second
part denotes the variable cost. The demand shifter A captures market size ad-
justed by the ideal price index and takes the following form:
(11) A ≡
( γE
P1−σ
)1/σ
,
where E is the total income of the economy. The number of entrepreneurs per
firm is normalized to one, or, m0 = 1. A big enough b is chosen to ensure that
the probability of being monitored for any worker does not exceed one.
The firm’s optimal decisions given the number of layers can be solved in
two steps. First, given an output level q, the first order conditions (FOCs) with
respect to mi’s imply
(12) wT mT = 2wT−1mT−1 = ... = 2T−1w1m1,
where m0 = 1 and mT = q. Thus, the number of workers at layer i is
(13) mi(q,T ) = 2i
( q
2T
) 2T −2T−i
2T −1 T ≥ i ≥ 0.
As a result, the firm’s span of control at layer i is
(14) xi(q,T ) =
mi(q,T )
mi−1(q,T )
= 2
( q
2T
) 2T−i
2T −1 T ≥ i ≥ 1,
which indicates that the number of workers increases disproportionately more
12First, Rebitzer (1995) found evidence of a trade-off between supervision intensity and wage
payment. Groshen and Krueger (1990) and Ewing and Payne (1999) found evidence on a nega-
tive relationship between the span of control and the wage paid to subordinates.
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at lower layers when output increases. This is due to the fixed number of en-
trepreneurs at the top.
Second, optimal output and the number of production workers are deter-
mined by
(15) q(θ,T ) = mT (θ,T ) =
[
Aβθ
1
σ
bψ22−
T
2T −1
] σ(2T −1)
σ+(2T −1)
,
where β ≡ (σ − 1)/σ. Substituting equations (13) and (15) into equation (10)
leads to the firm’s operating profit (i.e., profit before paying the fixed cost) and
revenue as
(16) pi(θ,T ) =
(
1 − β(2
T − 1)
2T
)
(Aθ
1
σ )
2Tσ
σ+(2T −1)
(
β/bψ(
2
2T+1−2−T
2T −1
)) (σ−1)(2
T −1)
σ+(2T −1)
and
(17) S (θ,T ) = (Aθ
1
σ )
2Tσ
σ+(2T −1)
(
β/bψ(
2
2T+1−2−T
2T −1
)) (σ−1)(2
T −1)
σ+(2T −1)
,
which will be used later. With the firm’s optimal decisions on employment and
output in hand, I can solve for the optimal number of layers, which is the final
step to solve the firm’s optimization problem.
II.C Layers, Wages, and Empirical Implications
This subsection characterizes the firm’s cost functions in order to solve for the
optimal number of layers. Furthermore, it derives testable predictions on the
relationship between firm size and wages (and the span of control).
Consider a firm that produces q units of output. The variable cost function
of such a firm is given by13
TVC(q, b) = min
T≥1
TVCT (q, b),
13For firms that have one layer (i.e., self-employed entrepreneurs), management hierarchies
are not needed. As this paper focuses on management hierarchies, I do not consider these firms
in the paper.
13
where TVC(q, b) is the minimum variable cost of producing q, and TVCT (q, b)
is the minimum variable cost of producing q using T + 1 layers which can be
expressed as
(18)
TVCT (q, b) =
T∑
i=1
mi(q,T )wi(q,T ) =
T∑
i=1
bψ
m2i (q,T )
mi−1(q,T )
= (2− 1
2T−1
)bψ21−
T
2T−1 q
2T
2T −1 .
Variable cost given the number of layers increases with output. Better MT (a
smaller b) pushes down the variable cost given any number of layers propor-
tionately. the following proposition characterizes the AVC curves and the MC
curves for the firm.
Proposition 1. Given the number of layers, both the average variable cost and
the marginal cost increase continuously with output. The average variable cost
curve kinks and its slope decreases at the output level where the firm adds a
layer. The marginal cost falls discontinuously when the firm adds a layer. Firms
that produce more have more layers.
Proof. See Appendix A.B. 
Figure 3 illustrates the AVC curve and the MC curve. The AVC curve de-
noted by the bold green curve is the lower envelope of all AVC curves given dif-
ferent numbers of layers, and the MC curve is represented by the green curve.
The span of control increases at all layers when the firm increases output but
not the number of layers, which implies that both AVC and MC increase with
output. Wages fall at existing layers when the firm adds a layer owing to the
smaller span of control. This leads to a discontinuous decrease in the MC curve
and a kink in the AVC curve when the firm adds a layer.
Proposition 1 establishes a positive relationship between output and the opti-
mal number of layers, which is consistent with the empirical finding of Caliendo,
Monte and Rossi-Hansberg (2015). When the output level is low, it is ideal to
have a smaller number of layers. This is because adding a layer is like an invest-
ment that reduces MC at the expense of a fixed cost. In summary, the number
of layers and output increase hand in hand in equilibrium.
The relationship between the firm’s demand draw and the optimal number
of layers is similar to the relationship between output and the optimal number
14
Figure 3: Average Variable Cost and Marginal Cost
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of layers, as the firm with a better demand draw produces more in equilibrium.
The following proposition summarizes this relationship.
Proposition 2. Firms that receive better demand draws have more layers.
Proof. See Appendix A.C. 
Proposition 2 and the distinctive feature of the AVC curve discussed above
are the keys to understanding the selection effect of an improvement in MT. Im-
proved MT reduces the labor cost and incentivizes firms to grow. Moreover, it
incentivizes firms with better demand draws to expand more and benefits them
more, since the organizationally augmented production technology features en-
dogenous increasing returns to scale (with respect to the number of layers). I.e.,
firms with better demand draws have more layers, and the elasticity of the AVC
with respect to output is smaller for these firms. This property is the key to gen-
erating the heterogenous effect of improved MT on various firms in an industry
equilibrium.
The monitoring-based hierarchy model has predictions for firm-level out-
comes, which are summarized by the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Given the number of layers, both the span of control and wages
increase with the firm’s quality draw at all layers. Furthermore, the wage ratio
(i.e., supervisor’s wage divided by direct subordinate’s wage) increases with the
firm’s quality draw at all layers. When the firm adds a layer owing to a marginal
improvement in the quality of its product, both the span of control and wages fall
at existing layers. Furthermore, the wage ratio decreases at existing layers.
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Proof. See Section 2 of Online Appendix. 
The change in the span of control is the key to understanding this propo-
sition. When the firm keeps the number of layers unchanged, the only way to
expand is to increase the span of control. When the span of control is larger,
higher incentive-compatible wages are needed. Furthermore, wages increase
disproportionately more at upper layers, since the share of workers at upper
layers (in total employment) decreases when the firm grows without adjusting
the number of layers. As a result, the firm tolerates disproportionately more
increases in wages at upper layers.
When the firm expands by adding a layer, the constraint at the top is re-
laxed.14 Thus, the firm can expand and economize on its labor cost at the same
time. As a result, the span of control decreases at existing layers, which leads
to lower wages paid to employees at existing layers. On top of that, wages fall
disproportionately more at upper layers, as the share of workers at upper (ex-
isting) layers (in total employment) increases after the addition of a new layer.
This increase incentivizes the firm to reduce wages at upper layers more.15
The results of Proposition 3 are consistent with the evidence presented in
Caliendo, Monte and Rossi-Hansberg (2015). Importantly, the non-monotonic
relationship between firm size and wages (and relative wages) finds support
from the French data used in Caliendo, Monte and Rossi-Hansberg (2015). Fur-
thermore, the model’s unambiguous prediction on the relative wage receives
support from findings in Caliendo, Monte and Rossi-Hansberg (2015).
II.D Equilibrium Analysis
I close the model by aggregating across firms and solve for the equilibrium
in this subsection. There are two product markets and one labor market. En-
trepreneurs decide whether or not to enter the CES sector and must be indiffer-
ent between entering and not entering in equilibrium due to the large pool of
potential entrepreneurs. Workers choose which sector and which labor submar-
14As in Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012), I assume that the firm adds a layer from above.
As the entrepreneur is at layer zero, layer i becomes layer i + 1 where i ≥ 1, when the en-
trepreneur adds a layer.
15Since adding a layer happens discretely when the demand draw increases, it is true in the
theory that firms with more layers pay higher wages, if we impose restrictions on functional
forms and parameter values.
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ket to enter, which will be explained in what follows. They must be indifferent
between sectors and various labor submarkets in equilibrium, since they can
freely move across sectors and firms.
There are two equilibrium conditions for the CES sector: the zero cutoff
payoff (ZCP) condition and the free entry (FE) condition. They are used to pin
down two equilibrium variables: the exit cutoff for the quality draw (i.e., θ¯) and
the mass of active firms in equilibrium (i.e., M). First, the ZCP condition that
firms with the quality draw θ¯ earn zero payoff can be written as
(19) Π(θ¯, A) = 0,
where Π(θ¯, A) ≡ pi(θ¯,T (θ¯, A), A) − ( f0 + ψ) is the entrepreneur’s payoff. This
condition pins down the exit cutoff θ¯ given the adjusted market size A. Note
that the ZCP condition here incorporates both the fixed cost to produce and the
cost of exerting effort, as entrepreneurs of active firms exert effort to monitor
their subordinates in equilibrium. For simplicity, I use f ≡ f0 + ψ to denote the
overall “fixed cost” to produce.
The FE condition implies that the expected payoff obtained from entering
the CES sector equals the outside option of entrepreneurs, or
(20)
∫ ∞
θ¯
Π(θ, A)g(θ)dθ = fe,
where g(θ) is the probability density function (PDF) of the quality draw θ. This
equation determines the adjusted market size A given the exit cutoff θ¯.
The mass of firms is undetermined in the homogeneous sector, and the man-
agerial talent is not needed this sector either. Given the assumptions of a linear
production technology and perfect competition, firm boundaries are not defined
in that sector. Therefore, I assume that entrepreneurs choose whether or not to
enter the CES sector. In equilibrium, the FE condition holds with equality if and
only if
N ≥ M
1 −G(θ¯) ,
where M is the mass of active firms in equilibrium, and G(θ) is the cumulative
distribution function (CDF) of θ. A sufficiently large N ensures that the above
inequality holds.
The equilibrium condition for the homogeneous sector is that supply of the
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homogeneous good equals the demand for it, or
(21) phLh = (1 − γ)E,
where Lh is the number of workers in the homogeneous sector. This condition
pins down ph, which is the price of the homogeneous good as well as workers’
wage in this sector.
The labor market in the CES sector is characterized by directed search.
Firms demand workers for each layer, and a worker chooses one type of job
to apply for in order to maximize the expected payoff. Firms randomly select
workers among those who come to apply for jobs to employ. A type of job (a
labor submarket) corresponds to a firm-layer pair (θ, i), as different firms offer
different wages for various positions (i.e., layers). As workers are homogeneous
and can freely choose which type of job to apply for, the expected payoff from
applying for any type of job must be the same in equilibrium. Moreover, this
uniform expected payoff must be equal to the wage offered in the homogeneous
sector. In total, I have
(22)
mi(θ)
Q(θ, i)
(wi(θ) − ψ) = mi
′ (θ
′
)
Q(θ′ , i′)
(wi′ (θ
′
) − ψ) = ph ∀ (i, i′) ∀ (θ, θ′),
where mi(θ) is the firm’s labor demand at layer i(≥ 1), and Q(θ, i) is the num-
ber of workers who come to apply for this type of job. Different job turn-down
rates across labor submarkets (i.e., Q(θ,i)−mi(θ)Q(θ,i) ≥ 0) equalize the expected payoff
obtained from entering various labor submarkets. As a result, there is unem-
ployment in equilibrium.
I derive the labor-market-clearing condition in two steps. First, the number
of workers who choose to enter the CES sector (i.e., Lc) can be derived from
equation (22), or
Lc =
∫ ∞
θ=θ¯
T (θ,A)∑
i=1
Q(θ, i)
Mg(θ)
1 −G(θ¯)dθ
=
WP(θ¯, A,M) − ψLD(θ¯, A,M)
ph
,(23)
where WP(θ¯, A,M) is the total wage payment in the CES sector, and LD(θ¯, A,M)
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is the number of workers employed in the CES sector which equals
(24) LD =
∫ ∞
θ=θ¯
T (θ,A)∑
i=1
m(θ, i)
Mg(θ)
1 −G(θ¯)dθ.
Equation (23) says that total expected payoff of workers entering the CES sec-
tor (i.e., phLc) is the difference between the total wage payment and the total
disutility to exert effort.16
Second, the labor-market-clearing condition indicates that the number of
workers employed in the homogeneous sector is
(25) Lh = L − Lc.
Equations (23) and (25) are two labor market equilibrium conditions that are
used to determine the allocation of labor between sectors.
The market-clearing condition of the final composite good implies that
(26) E =
∫ ∞
θ¯
LC(θ)
Mg(θ)
1 −G(θ¯)dθ + phLh +
[
f0M + fe
M
1 −G(θ¯)
]
+ ψM,
where LC(θ) is the total wage payment of firms with demand draw θ. The third
part of the right hand side (RHS) of equation (26) is the demand for the final
composite good by firms, and the last part of RHS of equation (26) is the con-
sumption of active entrepreneurs who earn profit in equilibrium. Total income
of the economy equals total expenditure which includes two parts: demand from
workers and demand from firms (i.e., entrepreneurs).17
The equilibrium of this economy is characterized by the quality threshold of
the firm that obtains zero payoff, θ¯, the mass of firms that operate M, the price
of the homogeneous good ph, the labor allocation between two sector, Lc and
Lh, and the aggregate income E. These six equilibrium variables are obtained
by solving the six equations (i.e., equations (19), (20), (21), (23), (25) and (26)).
One equilibrium condition is redundant due to Walras’ law, and I normalize the
price of the final composite good to one.
16For further discussion of the labor market equilibrium in the CES sector, see Section 3 of
Online Appendix.
17Note that only workers and active entrepreneurs demand goods in equilibrium. En-
trepreneurs who choose not to enter the CES sector and those who enter the CES sector but
do not produce do not consume goods.
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One implicit assumption for the existence of the equilibrium is that the prob-
ability of being employed implied by equation (23) is smaller than or equal to
one in every labor submarket in equilibrium. In other words, wages offered in
the CES sector must satisfy
(27) wi(θ) − ψ ≥ ph ∀ (i, θ),
where wi(θ) is determined in equation (9). The above inequality would be vio-
lated if ψ were zero. Firms do not need to pay incentive-compatible wages to
workers, if exerting effort does not generate any cost to them. In the paper, I
focus on the case in which unemployment exists in every labor submarket for
two reasons. First, the model yields clean insights and testable implications in
this case. Second, firm-level and aggregate-level predictions derived in this case
are consistent with existing evidence. The following proposition discusses the
existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium with unemployment.
Proposition 4. When σ−1
σ
> γ, there exists a unique equilibrium with unemploy-
ment in every labor submarket, if the labor endowment (i.e., L) is small enough;
When σ−1
σ
< γ, there exists a unique equilibrium with unemployment in every
labor submarket if the labor endowment is big enough.
Proof. See Section 3 of Online Appendix. 
The labor endowment affects the outside option of workers through two
channels. First, a bigger labor endowment reduces worker’s wage in the ho-
mogeneous sector as a result of the supply-side effect. Second, a bigger labor
endowment increases total income of the economy, which leads to bigger de-
mand for labor and an increase in equilibrium wage in the homogeneous sector.
The relative strength of these two effects depends on σ. When σ−1
σ
> γ the latter
effect dominates, and a small enough labor endowment assures the existence of
a unique equilibrium with unemployment in all labor submarkets.
III Management Technology, Institutional Quality,
and Aggregate Economic Outcomes
This section investigates how an economy-wide improvement in MT affects firm
characteristics, the firm size distribution and welfare.
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III.A Selection Effect of Better Management Technology
I consider a scenario in which MT that is common across all firms improves.
This improvement occurs when labor markets are deregulated, or better man-
agement education and practices are introduced into an economy. Such an im-
provement is equivalent to a decrease in b in the model, since it becomes easier
for the firm to catch and fire shirking workers after the change. As a result,
firms’ labor cost decreases.
An improvement in MT generates a selection effect that reallocates resources
toward bigger and more efficient firms. Specifically, such an improvement bene-
fits all firms, since it reduces firms’ labor cost. Moreover, firms with more layers
gain more, since the organizationally augmented production technology features
endogenous increasing returns to scale (with respect to the number of layers).18
More precisely, the AVC functions of firms with more layers have smaller elas-
ticities with respect to output. As a result, firms with the worst demand draws
are forced to exit; firms whose demand draws are in the middle receive shrink-
ing revenue and profit; and firms with the best demand draws expand. In short,
an improvement in MT facilitates within-industry resource reallocation through
benefiting bigger firms more, which is what Bloom et al. (2013) argued in their
paper.
Heterogeneity in the number of layers is the key to understanding the selec-
tion effect. In a hypothetical world, if all firms were forced to have the same
number of layers, this uneven effect would disappear. This is because all firms
would operate using the same AVC function in such a world, and the endoge-
nous increasing returns to scale production technology would disappear without
the heterogeneity in the number of layers. As a result, the exit cutoff and firms’
relative market shares would not be affected by improved MT in this hypothet-
ical world. This explains why I adopt a hierarchy model with the endogenous
choice of the number of layers in order to study the selection effect of better MT.
For more details, see Section IV.
In order to derive analytical results on the firm size distribution and the dis-
tribution of the number of layers, I assume that θ follows a Pareto distribution
18These firms’ AVCs increase less rapidly with output.
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with a coefficient k, or
(28) G(θ) = 1 −
(θmin
θ
)k
,
where G(θ) is the CDF of the demand draw θ. The following proposition sum-
marizes changes in firm characteristics when MT gets improved. Note that the
above distributional assumption is only needed for the results on the firm size
distribution and the distribution of the number of layers.
Proposition 5. Suppose management technology that is common across all
firms improves. Consider the case in which the minimum number of layers
among active firms is unchanged. For the economy as a whole, the exit cut-
off for the quality draw increases. At the firm level, all surviving firms either
increase the number of layers (weakly) or make the span of control bigger and
keep the number of layers unchanged. Finally, if the quality draw follows a
Pareto distribution, both the firm size distribution and the distribution of the
number of layers move to the right in the First-Order-Stochastic-Dominance
(FOSD) sense.
Proof. See Appendix A.D. 
I focus on the case in which the minimum number of layers of active firms
is unchanged when MT improves, although similar results emerge in the other
cases. I focus on this case, as there are always some small firms that have only
two layers (i.e., T = 1) in every economy of the world. Therefore, the case
considered in the paper is empirically more relevant.
The FOSD result for the firm size distribution has implications for resource
allocation and are consistent with the data. It implies economies with superior
MT are associated with fewer small firms and bigger average firm size. Fur-
thermore, firms with better demand draws have larger market shares in such
economies as well. These predictions are consistent with several recent empir-
ical findings. For instance, Hsieh and Klenow (2009, 2012) showed that India
and China are worse at getting efficient firms to obtain big market shares com-
pared with the U.S. Hsieh and Olken (2014) found that it is the big firms that
are constrained more in developing countries, not the small firms. In short, em-
pirical predictions of the key theoretical result of my model (i.e., the selection
effect) square well with the existing evidence.
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How does the internal organization of the firm evolve when MT improves?
The model predicts that surviving firms either increase the number of layers or
enlarge the span of control, as better MT incentivizes firms to expand. Bloom et
al. (2013) documented that Indian firms that had received free access to better
MT expanded through the establishment of new plants rather than the expansion
of existing plants. This finding is consistent with my model’s prediction, since
establishing a new plant is like increasing the span of control of the firm owner
or adding an additional layer between the owner and lower-level production
units.
III.B Better Management Technology, Welfare and Total Out-
put
Other than firm-level outcomes, I am also interested in how improved MT af-
fects the worker’s welfare, which is the worker’s expected payoff obtained from
entering the CES (or homogeneous) sector. Better MT can either increase or
decrease welfare due to multiple frictions in the model. First, there is a moral
hazard problem inside the firm. Second, there is monopolistic distortion in one
of the two sectors of this economy. Finally, there is a labor market friction due
to the directed search. Therefore, a reduction in one friction does not necessarily
increase welfare. The factor governing the direction of the change in welfare is
the elasticity of substitution between products in the CES sector, since it deter-
mines whether the CES sector expands after an improvement in MT.
Workers in the CES sector face a trade-off between lower wages and higher
probabilities of being employed. When MT improves, employed workers re-
ceive lower wages and payoffs on average. At the same time, firms demand
more labor as well.19 On top of that, the elasticity of substitution governs the
sensitivity of the firm’s expansion (i.e., the increase in average employment)
with respect to an improvement in MT. When products are more substitutable,
this sensitivity is higher. Thus, the increase in employment per firm is bigger,
and this bigger increase eventually raises the aggregate income, making the mar-
ket size bigger as well. As a result, the CES sector accommodates more firms,
and its aggregate labor demand increases, which leads to an increase in the av-
erage probability of being employed. In summary, when MT improves and the
19Remember that average firm size in terms of employment increases when MT improves.
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elasticity of substitution is high, the increase in the probability of getting a job
dominates the ex post wage loss, which leads to a higher welfare for the worker.
The opposite story happens when the elasticity of substitution is low. I.e., the
increase in employment per firm is small, which leads to fewer firms and lower
aggregate labor demand in the CES sector. Worker’s welfare goes down in this
case, as both average wage and average employment rate decrease.20
The aggregate improvement in MT can lead to either an increase or a de-
crease in total output as well, and the key determinant is the strength of the
selection effect again. After an improvement in MT, firms increase the share
of non-production workers in employment in order to exploit the improved MT
better, as surviving firms add layers of non-production workers (weakly) into
the hierarchy. Although this reorganization is optimal for the firm and increases
firm profit (coming from lower efficiency wages paid to existing employees), it
is not optimal for the economy as non-production workers do not produce out-
put. In fact, it is a wasteful way to allocate labor resource from the perspective
of a social planner. At the same time, thanks to the selection effect, produc-
tion workers are reallocated to firms with better demand draws. As a result, the
economy is using production workers more efficiently after MT improves, as
more production workers are used to produce more valuable goods. Of course,
the total effect depends on which force is stronger. When market competition
is stiffer (i.e., when goods are more substitutable) in the CES sector, the real-
location effect becomes stronger, meaning that expansion of firms with better
demand draws is large after MT improves. Therefore, total output increases
when market competition is stronger and vice versa.
The above discussions on welfare are not analytical results, although simu-
lation results do show that welfare can either increase or decrease after an im-
provement in MT. Table 1 (and Table 2) presents an example in which welfare
increases (and decreases) when MT improves.
IV Selection Effect and the Number of Layers
In this section, I show that the selection effect disappears, when the number
of layers is fixed at a constant for all firms or monitoring becomes costless.
20The above discussions on welfare are not analytical results, although simulation results do
show that welfare can either increase or decrease after an improvement in MT.
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Table 1: Change in Welfare when MT Improves and σ is Big
Welfare Ave(wage) Ave(jtr) M E
b=1.6 0.29 0.96 0.56 1.02 25.66
b=1.5 0.35 0.90 0.42 1.15 31.33
Notes: jtr: job turn-down rate; M: the mass of active firms; E: total income
Parameter Value: σ = 3.8, γ = 0.6, ψ = 0.3
Table 2: Change in Welfare when MT Improves and σ is Small
Welfare Ave(wage) Ave(jtr) M E
b=1.6 0.38 0.95 0.41 2.61 53.49
b=1.5 0.29 0.90 0.51 1.90 41.07
Notes: jtr: job turn-down rate; M: the mass of active firms; E: total income
Parameter Value: σ = 2.8, γ = 0.75, ψ = 0.3
In Appendix B, I show that the selection effect disappears again, if we do not
model the choice of the number of layers. On the contrary, I show that the
selection effect still exists, if firms choose the number of layers optimally before
MT improves, but cannot adjust the number of layers after MT improves. For
simplicity, I consider an economy in which the demand draw follows a Pareto
distribution as specified in equation (28) in this subsection.
IV.A Fixed Number of Layers (at a Constant for all Firms)
In this subsection, I consider a case in which all firms use the structure of owner-
production worker (i.e., T = 1) to produce. After substituting the profit function
(for T = 1) in equation (16) and the ZCP condition in equation (19) into the FE
condition in equation (20), I end up with
f
∫ ∞
θ=θ¯
(
θ
θ¯
) 2
σ+1 kθkmin
θk+1
dθ − f
(
θmin
θ¯
)k
= fe,
which leads to the result that
θ¯ = θmin
( f ( 2
σ+1
)
fe
(
k − 2
σ+1
)) 1k .
Thus, the exit cutoff, θ¯, is independent of the quality of MT (i.e., 1/b). The key
to understanding this result is that the ratio of operating profit (and revenue) of
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two firms receiving different demand draws is independent of b:
pi(θ1, 1)
pi(θ2, 1)
=
(
θ1
θ2
) 2
σ+1
.
Furthermore, the above property holds for T > 1 as well,21 any change in MT
affects all firms equally, as long as firms have the same number of layers. There-
fore, any economy-wide improvement in MT does not favor one type of firm
over another. As a result, the selection effect of improved MT and its impact on
the firm size distribution disappear.
IV.B Costless Monitoring
In this subsection, I consider the case in which b = 0. In other words, monitoring
is costless, and there is no need to set up a monitoring-based hierarchy. The
wage determination in this case features a downward rigidity, since the firm has
to compensate workers the disutility of exerting effort. In equilibrium, wages
offered in the CES sector is the same across firms and equal ψ + ph.22 If the
disutility of exerting effort, ψ, is too high, there is unemployment in the CES
sector in equilibrium and vice versa. For a firm with the demand draw of θ, its
profit is
pi(θ) =
Aσθβσ−1
(ph + ψ)σ−1σ
.
As a result, the FE condition can be written as
f
∫ ∞
θ=θ¯
(
θ
θ¯
)
kθkmin
θk+1
dθ − f
(
θmin
θ¯
)k
= fe,
which leads to the result that
(29) θ¯ = θmin
(
f
fe(k − 1)
) 1
k
.
21For any T , the ratio of the operating profit (and revenue) of two firms with demand draws
of θ1 and θ2 is pi(θ1, 1)/pi(θ2, 1) = (θ1/θ2)2
T /(2T +σ−1) which is independent of b.
22Remember that the net payoff of an employee who works in the CES sector is wage minus
the effort cost. Firms in the CES sector have no incentives to offer wages higher than ψ + ph,
and workers entering this sector do not accept wages below ψ + ph.
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Again, a change in the quality of MT does not affect the exit cutoff and relative
market shares of two firms with different demand draws.
The key observation is that when the participation constraint binds which
is true when b approaches zero,23 wage setting is not interrupted by the moral
hazard problem of the worker in CES sector. As a result, MT which affects
monitoring efficiency does not matter for the determination of wage and firm
costs. In other words, when we vary b from an extremely big number to zero,
wage setting in the CES sector switches from the one derived from the incen-
tive compatibility (IC) constraint (i.e., equation (9)) to the one derived from the
participation constraint (PC) which implies w = ph + ψ. After b enters into the
range in which equilibrium wage is pinned down by PC, MT does not play a
role in determining aggregate variables. Therefore, MT does not generate the
selection effect in the case of costless monitoring.24
IV.C No Adjustment in the Number of Layers after MT Im-
proves
In this subsection, I argue that the selection effect still exists, even if firms can-
not adjust their numbers of layers after MT improves. The formal proof for
this follows the proof for Proposition 5 closely and is presented in Appendix C.
Here, I highlight economic insights coming from the proof. The key to under-
standing this result is that if firms with worse demand draws weakly benefit from
such an improvement, it must be the case that firms with better demand draws
strictly benefit from such an improvement. If the exit cutoff did not increase
after MT improve which implies (weakly) increasing profit for firms with the
worst demand draws,25 firms with the best demand draws would strictly benefit.
23Note that workers in CES sector have to obtain at least ph + ψ as their expected wage
in equilibrium. When b is extremely close to zero, wage derived in equation (9) falls below
ph + ψ. As a result, the equilibrium wage, ph + ψ, makes the participation constraint bind and
the incentive compatibility constraint slack.
24Firms are heterogeneous and offer different wages in equilibrium. As all workers have
the same outside option, it might be the case that wages offered in some firms are based on
IC constraint while others are based on PC. Analysis for this type of equilibrium is extremely
difficult, as there are two many possible cases to consider. The two types of equilibrium (one in
which wage offered by all firms is pinned down by IC constraint and the other one in which wage
offered by all firms is pinned down by PC) I consider in the paper yield sharp and economically
meaningful insights.
25Note that these firms also have the smallest number of layers in equilibrium.
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As a result, the free entry condition would be violated. Therefore, the exit cutoff
must go up when MT improves, and firms with the worst demand draws exit the
market. On top of that, resources are reallocated to firms with the best demand
draws. In other words, the selection effect of an improvement in MT still exists
when no firms cannot adjust their numbers of layers after MT improves.
In total, this section shows that it is the heterogeneity in the number of layers
(across firms) that matters for the selection effect of better MT. And, the adjust-
ment in the number of layers after MT improves is not the key to generating the
selection effect.
V Conclusions
This paper uses one canonical approach to modeling the incentive problem in-
side the firm and incorporates a monitoring-based hierarchy into an industry
equilibrium framework to show the selection effect of an improvement in MT.
By investigating how MT affects firm characteristics and resource allocation,
this paper rationalizes several key empirical findings established in the macro-
development literature.
The main contribution of this paper is to explore the selection effect of a
common improvement in MT for resource allocation. This effect comes from
the heterogeneous impact of such an improvement on firms with various effi-
ciency levels. As a result, resources are reallocated from small firms to big
firms, which leads to changes in firm size and welfare. Furthermore, the key to
understanding this selection effect is shown to be the endogenous selection of
the number of layers. These economic insights and implications open room for
future research on management quality and firm organization.
Undoubtedly, much more research remains to be done. First, integrating the
knowledge-based hierarchy and the monitoring-based hierarchy into a unified
framework is an interesting idea. Second, investigating how MT affects firm
boundary (e.g., outsourcing or in-house production) is also an interesting topic
to explore. Finally, how import competition and export orientation affect man-
agement quality empirically is also worth exploring in the near future.
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A Appendix: Proofs
A.A Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. First, suppose that there is a worker at layer i who shirks in equilibrium
(i.e., ai = 0). If he is a production worker, removing him from the hierarchy
does not affect the firm’s output and (weakly) reduces labor cost. If he is a non-
production worker, his direct subordinates at layer i+1 would shirk as a result of
the absence of monitoring from above. Furthermore, all his direct and indirect
subordinates would shirk as well. Similar to before, removing them from the
hierarchy does not affect the firm’s output and (weakly) reduces the labor cost,
which means excluding them from the hierarchy is always optimal. Thus, all
workers are incentivized to work in equilibrium. Second, the reason why the
firm wants to allocate the monitoring intensities evenly across workers is that it
could reduce wage payments by doing so, if the monitoring intensities were not
equalized. More specifically, suppose there are two units of effort inputs that are
monitored under different monitoring intensities p1 and p2. As all workers are
incentivized to work, the wage payment to these two units equals
bψ
( 1
p1
+
1
p2
)
.
However, the firm can reduce this wage payment by equalizing the monitoring
intensities across these two units of effort inputs as
2bψ
1
(p1 + p2)/2
< bψ
( 1
p1
+
1
p2
)
for any p1 , p2. This means that the firm can elicit the two units of effort
inputs under a lower cost. Therefore, the firm’s optimal choice is to equalize the
monitoring intensities across workers at a given layers. 
A.B Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. The AVC function and the MC function given the number of layers are
(A.1) AVC(q,T ) = (2 − 1
2T−1
)bψ21−
T
2T−1 q
1
2T −1
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and
(A.2) MC(q,T ) = bψ22−
T
2T−1 q
1
2T −1 =
2T
2T − 1AVC(q,T ).
From the expression of these two cost functions, it is straightforward to see that
both of them increase with output q given the number of layers T + 1. Thus, the
first part of the proposition has been proved.
Next, I discuss the overall shape of the AVC curve. Before the discussion,
let me make the following notation for future use.
Definition 1. Let qT be the solution to the following equation:
AVC(qT ,T ) = AVC(qT ,T + 1).
In other words, the AVC of using T + 1 layers is equal to the AVC of using T + 2
layers at output level qT .
Now, I prove the following lemma which assures the monotonicity of qT .
Lemma 2. qT increases in T .
Proof. I rewrite AVC(qT ,T ) = AVC(qT ,T + 1) as
(2 − 12T−1 )/2
T
2T −1
(2 − 12(T+1)−1 )/2
(T+1)
2(T+1)−1
q
1
2T −1−
1
2(T+1)−1
T = 1.
Thus, the switching point qT can be rewritten as
qT =
[2T+1 − 1
2T+1 − 2
] (2T −1)(2T+1−1)
2T 2(T−1)+
1
2T ≡ Ψ1(T )Ψ2(T ).
Taking logs and calculating the first order derivative with respect to T yields the
following result:
d[ln(Ψ1(T )) + ln(Ψ2(T ))]
dT
= ln 2(2T+1−2−T ) ln
(2T+1 − 1
2T+1 − 2
)
− ln 2 + ln 2
[
1− ln 2
2T
]
.
Thus, the sign of the above expression depends on
S ign
(d[ln(Ψ1(T )) + ln(Ψ2(T ))]
dT
)
= S ign
(
(22T+1 − 1) ln(2
T+1 − 1
2T+1 − 2) − ln 2
)
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or
S ign
(d[ln(Ψ1(T )) + ln(Ψ2(T ))]
dT
)
= S ign
(
(22T+1 − 1) ln(2
T+1 − 1
2T − 1 ) − 2
2T+1 ln 2
)
or
S ign
(d[ln(Ψ1(T )) + ln(Ψ2(T ))]
dT
)
= S ign
(
(1 − 2−(2T+1)) ln(2
T+1 − 1
2T − 1 ) − ln 2
)
.
I want to show that (1− 2−(2T+1)) ln(2T+1−12T−1 )− ln 2 decreases in T for T ≥ 1. First,
I have
d
[
(1 − 2−(2T+1)) ln(2T+1−12T−1 ) − ln 2
]
dT
= ln 2
[
ln(
2T+1 − 1
2T − 1 )
1
22T
− (1 − 1
22T+1
) 1
2T+1 − 3 + 12T
]
≡ ln 2(K1(T ) − K2(T )).
Second, I prove that
K1(T ) − K2(T ) < 0
for all T ≥ 1. I proceed in two steps. In the first step, calculation shows that
K1(1) − K2(1) < 0. In the second step, it is straightforward to see that for any
T > 1
K1(T ) <
1
22(T−1)
K1(1)
and
K2(T ) >
1
2T−1
K2(1).
Thus, I have
K1(T ) − K2(T ) < K1(1) − K2(1) < 0
for all T > 1. Finally, due to the monotonicity of (1 − 2−(2T+1)) ln(2T+1−12T−1 ) − ln 2
with respect to T which has just been proved, I conclude that
(1 − 2−(2T+1)) ln(2
T+1 − 1
2T − 1 ) − ln 2 > limT→∞(1 − 2
−(2T+1)) ln(
2T+1 − 1
2T − 1 ) − ln 2 = 0.
and
S ign
(d[ln(Ψ1(T )) + ln(Ψ2(T ))]
dT
)
= S ign
(
(1 − 2−(2T+1)) ln(2
T+1 − 1
2T − 1 ) − ln 2
)
> 0.
Therefore, qT must be an increasing function of T . 
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Having established the monotonicity of qT in Lemma 2, I can characterize
the overall shape of the AVC curve.
Lemma 3. If the output produced in equilibrium q ∈ [qT−1, qT ), the optimal
number of layers is T + 1. At the output level qT , the AVC curve kinks and its
slope decreases discontinuously as the firms adds a layer. Finally, the switching
point qT does not depend on the firm’s quality draw (i.e., θ), the inefficiency of
MT (i.e., b) and the adjusted market size (i.e., A).
Proof. I proceed the proof in the following several steps. First, note that at
qT−1, the slope of AVC(q,T ) is smaller than the slope of AVC(q,T − 1) as
AVC(qT−1,T ) = AVC(qT−1,T − 1). This proves the second part of this lemma.
Second, due to this property, AVC(q,T − 1) is below AVC(q,T ) for q < qT−1
and above AVC(q,T ) for q > qT−1. Thus, T + 1 layers is never chosen for
q < qT−1. Similarly, T + 1 layers is never chosen for q > qT as AVC(q,T ) is
above AVC(q,T + 1) for q > qT . Third, as AVC(q,T ) is below AVC(q,T − 1)
for q > qT−1 and qT increases in T , AVC(q,T ) is below AVC(q, t) for all t < T
when q > qT−1. Similarly, as AVC(q,T + 1) is above AVC(q,T ) for q < qT and
qT increases in T , AVC(q, t) is above AVC(q,T ) for all t > T when q < qT .
In total, AVC(q,T ) is below AVC(q, t) for all t , T when q ∈ (qT−1, qT ) which
leads to the result that for q ∈ (qT−1, qT ), the optimal choice of layers is T + 1.
Of course, when q = qT−1, choosing either T layers or T + 1 layers is optimal.
Finally, the third half of the above lemma follows from the expression of qT
directly. 
I prove the following claim that characterizes the overall shape of the MC
curve.
Claim 1. Given the number of layers T + 1, the MC increases with output. The
final MC curve is
MC(q) = MC(q,T )
where q ∈ [qT−1, qT ). This cost increases in interval [qT−1, qT ) for all T and
decreases discontinuously at the point qT .
Proof. It is straightforward to see the first part of this proposition due to Lemma
3. The only thing that needs proof is the last part. First, it is straightforward to
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see that MC(q,T ) increases in q for a given T . Second, at qT , I have
AVC(qT ,T ) = AVC(qT ,T + 1).
As
MC(q,T ) =
2T
2T − 1AVC(q,T ),
it must be true that
MC(qT ,T ) > MC(qT ,T + 1).
The fall in the marginal cost when the firm adds a layer comes from the reorga-
nization inside the firm. 
In sum, I proved Proposition 1 due to Lemma 3 and Claim 1. 
A.C Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. The first part of this proposition is true because of the shape of the AVC
curve shown in Proposition 1. I prove the second of this proposition in five
steps. First, I define two demand thresholds for a given number of layers T + 1
for future use.
Definition 2. For the number of layers T + 1, θT1 is defined as the solution to
MR(θT1, qT ) = Aβθ
1
σ
T1q
− 1σ
T = MC(qT ,T + 1) = bψ2
2− T+1
2T+1−1 q
1
2T+1−1
T .
In other words, firms with the quality draw θT1 have their marginal revenue
(MR) curve intersect the MC curve of using T + 2 layers at output level qT .
θT3(> θT1) is defined as the solution to
MR(θT3, qT ) = Aβθ
1
σ
T3q
− 1σ
T = MC(qT ,T ) = bψ2
2− T
2T −1 q
1
2T −1
T .
In other words, firms with the quality draw θT3 have their MR curve intersect
the MC curve of T + 1 layers at output level qT .
The graphical representation of θT1 and θT3 is in Figure 4.
Second, I show that only when the firm’s quality draw is between [θT1, θT3],
does it have incentive to switch from T +1 layers to T +2 layers in the following
lemma.
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Figure 4: Lower and Upper Bounds on Layer-Switching from T = 1 to T = 2
Lemma 4. For each T , firms having the quality draw smaller than or equal to
θT1 prefer T + 1 layers over T + 2 layers, while firms having the quality draw
higher than or equal to θT3 prefer T + 2 layers over T + 1 layers.
Proof. First, note that as MC(qT ,T ) > MC(qT ,T + 1) and MR(θ, q) is an in-
creasing function of θ for a given q, it must be true that θT1 < θT3.
Next, if a firm with θ < θT1 chose T+2 layers, it must be true that q(θ,T+1) <
qT which is not optimal for the firm as AVC(q,T ) < AVC(q,T + 1) for output
levels smaller than qT . Thus, Firms with θ < θT1 prefer T + 1 layers over T + 2
layers. Similarly, if a firm with θ > θT3 chose T + 1 layers, it must be true that
q(θ,T ) > qT which contradicts that AVC(q,T ) > AVC(q,T +1) for output levels
bigger than qT . Thus, Firms with θ > θT3 prefer T + 2 layers over T + 1 layers.
Finally, when θ = θT1, choosing T + 1 layers yields more profit as
pi(θT1,T ) ≡ pi(θT1,T, q(θT1,T )) > pi(θT1,T, qT ) = pi(θT1,T +1, qT ) = pi(θT1,T +1),
where I have used the result that AVC(qT ,T ) = AVC(qT ,T +1). Similarly, when
θ = θT3, choosing T + 2 layers yields more profit as
pi(θT3,T+1) ≡ pi(θT3,T+1, q(θT3,T+1)) > pi(θT3,T+1, qT ) = pi(θT3,T, qT ) = pi(θT3,T ).

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Figure 5: Optimal Choice of the Number of Layers
Third, I use the following lemma to show the complementarity between the
benefit of adding a layer and the quality draw θ.
Lemma 5. For a given T , pi(θ,T + 1) − pi(θ,T ) increases continuously in θ for
θ ∈ [θT1, θT3].
Proof. I use Figure 5 to prove this lemma. For any θ ∈ [θT1, θT3], suppose the
quality draw θ increases by ∆(> 0) which corresponds to a shift of the MR curve
from the red one to the green one. The difference between pi(θ,T ) and pi(θ+∆,T )
is represented by the red region, while the difference between pi(θ,T + 1) and
pi(θ + ∆,T + 1) is represented by the sum of the red region and the blue region.
Thus, I have
pi(θ + ∆,T + 1) − pi(θ + ∆,T ) − [pi(θ,T + 1) − pi(θ,T )]
= [pi(θ + ∆,T + 1) − pi(θ,T + 1)] − [pi(θ + ∆,T ) − pi(θ,T )]
which is the blue region. As the MR curve moves upward when θ increases and
the MC curve of T + 2 layers lies below the MC curve of T + 1 layers when
q ≥ qT , the area of the blue region increases as ∆ increases. Thus, it must be
true that
pi(θ + ∆,T + 1) − pi(θ + ∆,T ) − [pi(θ,T + 1) − pi(θ,T )]
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increases in ∆ which means that pi(θ,T + 1) − pi(θ,T ) increases in θ for θ ∈
[θT1, θT3]. The continuity of pi(θ,T +1)−pi(θ,T ) in θ is straightforward to see. 
Fourth, I prove the following result which is the key step to prove this propo-
sition. More specifically, there exists a threshold θT2 ∈ (θT1, θT3) such that firms
with this quality draw is indifferent between having T +1 layers and having T +2
layers. Claim 2 summarizes the results.
Claim 2. For each T , there exists a threshold θT2 ∈ (θT1, θT3) such that firms
with this demand draw is indifferent between having T + 1 layers and having
T +2 layers. Moreover, firms with demand draws smaller than θT2 strictly prefer
T + 1 layers over T + 2 layers, while firms with demand draws bigger than θT2
strictly prefer T + 2 layers over T + 1 layers.
Proof. From Lemma 4, I have
pi(θT1,T ) > pi(θT1,T + 1),
and
pi(θT3,T ) < pi(θT3,T + 1).
As pi(θ,T + 1) − pi(θ,T ) continuously increases in θ for θ ∈ [θT1, θT3] due to
Lemma 5, there must exist a threshold θT2 ∈ (θT1, θT3) such that
pi(θT2,T ) = pi(θT2,T + 1).
And for all θ < θT2
pi(θ,T ) > pi(θ,T + 1),
while for all θ > θT2
pi(θ,T ) < pi(θ,T + 1).

Now, I can prove this proposition by generalizing Claim 2 into the case of
any two different values of the number of layers. First, I define the upper bound
and the lower bound on the quality draw for the firm’s changing the number of
layers from T0 to T1(> T0), where T0 and T1 can be any positive numbers. The
following definition is used for this purpose.
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Definition 3. For the numbers of layers T0 and T1(> T0), θ0T0,T1 is defined as
the solution to
MR(θ0T0,T1 , qT0,T1) = MC(qT0,T1 ,T1),
where qT0,T1 is the output level at which AVC(qT0,T1 ,T0) = AVC(qT0,T1 ,T1).
θ1T0,T1(> θ0T0,T1) is defined as the solution to
MR(θ1T0,T1 , qT0,T1) = MC(qT0,T1 ,T0).
Second, using the same approach used in the proof of Claim 2, one can prove
that there exists a quality cutoff θ2T0,T1 ∈ (θ0T0,T1 , θ1T0,T1) such that firms with
quality draws bigger than θ2T0,T1 prefer T1 + 1 layers over T0 + 1 layers and vice
versa. Third, suppose there are two firms with quality draws θ1 and θ0 > (θ1)
such that the firm with quality draw θ0 has fewer layers than the firm with quality
draw θ1. I use T1 + 1 and T0 + 1(< T1 + 1) to denote the number of layers for
firms with quality draws θ1 and θ0 respectively. Form the above discussion, it is
straightforward to see that this supposition can’t be true, as firms with quality
draws bigger than θ2T0,T1 prefer T1 + 1 layers over T0 + 1 layers and vice versa.
Therefore, firms with better demand draws have more layers.
Thanks to this proposition, I only need to derive the sequence of θT2 for
T = 1, 2, 3... when solving the optimal number of layers for each firm. In other
words, there is no need to solve the optimal number of layers for each firm
respectively. Simulations become much less time-consuming because of this
result. 
A.D Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. This proof consists of seven parts. I prove that the exit cutoff for the
quality draw increases and all firms increase the number of layers first.
I make the following notations. Suppose b decreases from b1 to b2(< b1)
due to an improvement in MT. Let θ¯1 (or θ¯2) be the demand threshold for exiting
when b = b1 (or b = b2). Let A1 (or A2) be the adjusted market size when b = b1
(or b = b2).
First, I discuss how the adjusted market size A changes when b decreases by
proving the following lemma.
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Lemma 6. When b decrease from b1 to b2, the change in the adjusted market
size must satisfy
1 >
A2
A1
>
b2
b1
.
Proof. First, note that if A2 ≥ A1, the exit cutoff θ¯ must decrease as b2 < b1.
However, a decreasing exit cutoff plus a weakly increasing adjusted market size
violate the FE condition defined in Equation (20). Thus, it must be true that
A2 < A1. Second, if A2/A1 ≤ b2/b1, the profit defined as the solution to Equation
(10) must decrease for all firms. Thus, the exit cutoff must increase. However,
the FE condition is violated again, as profit for all firms decreases, and the exit
cutoff increases. In total, it must be true that
1 >
A2
A1
>
b2
b1
.

Second, I show that all firms increase the number of layers weakly. It is
straightforward to observe that if A2/A1 = b2/b1, the optimal output, employ-
ment, and the number of layers would be unchanged. As I have proved that
A2/A1 > b2/b1 in Lemma 6, all surviving firms weakly increase their number of
layers. Furthermore, all surviving firms increase their output as well as employ-
ment after the management technology improves.
Third, I prove that the exit cutoff increases. I use T0 + 1 ≡ T (θ¯1, A1, b1) +
1 = T (θ¯2, A2, b2) + 1 to denote the number of layers for firms on the exit cutoff
and prove this result by contradiction. Suppose that the exit cutoff θ¯ decreased
weakly after MT improves (i.e., θ¯2 ≤ θ¯1). First, firms on the exit cutoff earn zero
payoff due to the ZCP condition or
pi(θ¯1,T (θ¯1, A1, b1), A1, b1) = pi(θ¯2,T (θ¯2, A2, b2), A2, b2) = f ,
as T0 = T (θ¯1, A1, b1) = T (θ¯2, A2, b2). This leads to
pi(θ¯2,T0, A2, b2)
pi(θ¯1,T0, A1, b1)
=
( θ¯2
θ¯1
) 2T0
σ+(2T0−1)
(A2
A1
) 2T0σ
σ+(2T0−1)
(b1
b2
) (σ−1)2T0
σ+2T0−1
(2T0−1)
2T0
≡ X(θ¯,T0)Y(A,T0)Z(b,T0) = 1,
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where θ¯ ≡ θ¯2/θ¯1, A ≡ A2/A1 < 1, and b ≡ b1/b2 > 1. As θ¯2 ≤ θ¯1,
Y(A,T0)Z(b,T0) ≥ 1,
which implies that
(A.3)
b(σ−1)(2
T0−1)(
1
A
)2T0σ > 1.
Second, for a firm whose demand draw is higher than θ¯1, its profit must increase
if it does not change the number of layers. To see this, first note that
pi(θ,T (θ, A2, b2), A2, b2)
pi(θ,T (θ, A1, b1), A1, b1)
=
(
b(σ−1)(2
T (θ)−1)(
1
A
)2T (θ)σ
) 1
σ+(2T (θ)−1)
,
where T (θ) ≡ T (θ, A1, b1) = T (θ, A2, b2) and T (θ) ≥ T0 as θ ≥ θ¯1. Next, we
know both b and 1/A are bigger than one. Thus, equation (A.3) implies that
b(σ−1)(2
T (θ)−1)(
1
A
)2T (θ)σ
=
(
b(σ−1)(2
T0−1)) 2T (θ)−12T0−1
((
1
A
)2T0σ) 2T (θ)2T0
> 1.
Accordingly, we have
(
b(σ−1)(2
T (θ)−1)(
1
A
)2T (θ)σ
) 1
σ+(2T (θ)−1)
> 1.
If the firm endogenously changes the number of layers, its profit must be bigger
than the profit it earns when b = b1 due to the revealed preference argument. In
total, I have
pi(θ,T (θ, A2, b2), A2, b2) ≥ pi(θ,T (θ, A1, b1), A1, b1) ∀ θ ≥ θ¯1
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for T (θ, A2, b2) = T (θ, A1, b1) and
pi(θ,T (θ, A2, b2), A2, b2) > pi(θ,T (θ, A1, b1), A1, b1) ∀ θ > θ¯1
for T (θ, A2, b2) > T (θ, A1, b1). Third, the ZCP condition in the new equilibrium
implies that firms with the quality draws between θ¯2 and θ¯1 earn non-negative
profit. In total, the expected profit from entry would exceed the entry cost fe if
the exit cutoff decreased which violates the FE condition. Therefore, the exit
cutoff must increase when b decreases.
Fourth, I prove that the distribution of the number of layers moves to the
right in the FOSD sense when MT improves. I make the following simplifying
notations. Let θT,2 be the threshold for the quality draw at which the firm in-
creases the number of layers from T + 1 to T + 2. Let Prob(t > T, b) be the
fraction of firms that have at least T + 2 layers when the quality of MT is 1/b.
Based on the above notations and the Pareto distribution on θ, I have
Prob(t > T, b) =
( θ¯
θT,2
)k
.
Therefore, the condition for Prob(t > T, b2) > Prob(t > T, b1) to hold is
θ¯1
θT,2
∣∣∣∣
b=b1
<
θ¯2
θT,2
∣∣∣∣
b=b2
,
where T ≥ T0. I derive the expression for θT,2 and prove the above inequality
in what follows. First, conditional on (b, A), the threshold for the firm to add a
layers is
θ
2T+1
σ+(2T+1−1)−
2T
σ+(2T −1)
T,2 =
b
(σ−1)(2T+1−1)
σ+(2T+1−1) −
(σ−1)(2T −1)
σ+(2T −1) (1 − β(2T−1)2T )
(
ψ2
2T+2−2−(T+1)
2T+1−1 /β
) (σ−1)(2T+1−1)
σ+(2T+1−1)
A
σ2T+1
σ+(2T+1−1)−
σ2T
σ+(2T −1) (1 − β(2T+1−1)2T+1 )
(
ψ2
2T+1−2−T
2T −1 /β
) (σ−1)(2T −1)
σ+(2T −1)
Thus, the ratio of θT,2 |b=b1
θT,2 |b=b2
can be written as
(
θT,2|b=b1
θT,2|b=b2
) 2T+1
σ+(2T+1−1)−
2T
σ+(2T −1)
= b
(σ−1)(2T+1−1)
σ+(2T+1−1) −
(σ−1)(2T −1)
σ+(2T −1) A
σ2T+1
σ+(2T+1−1)−
σ2T
σ+(2T −1) ,
where A ≡ A2/A1 < 1, and b ≡ b1/b2 > 1. This expression can be simplified
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further to
(A.4)
θT,2|b=b1
θT,2|b=b2
= (bA)σ.
Second, from the expression of firm’s profit function derived in Equation (16), I
have
(A.5)
θ¯1
θ¯2
= Aσb(σ−1)(1−
1
2T0
)
.
Finally, from equations (A.4) and (A.5), I conclude that
θ¯2
θT,2 |b=b2
θ¯1
θT,2 |b=b1
=
bσ
b(σ−1)(1−
1
2T0
)
> 1.
Therefore, for all T ≥ T0, Prob(t > T, b2) > Prob(t > T, b1) which is the
condition for the result of the FOSD to hold.
Fifth, I prove that the firm size distribution in terms of revenue moves to the
right in the FOSD sense when MT improves. I make the following simplifying
notations. Let S (θ¯i, Ai) ≡ S (θ¯i, Ai,T (θ¯i, Ai))i=1,2 be the revenue for firms with
quality draw θ¯i when they optimally choose the number of layers, and S (θ¯i, Ai,T )
be the revenue for firms with quality draw θ¯i when they choose to have T + 1
number of layers. Similarly, let q(θ¯i, Ai) ≡ q(θ¯i, Ai,T (θ¯i, Ai)) be the output for
firms with quality draw θ¯i when they optimally choose the number of layers, and
q(θ¯i, Ai,T ) be the output for firms with quality draw θ¯i when they choose to have
T + 1 number of layers.
As the distribution of θ is Pareto, and the firm’s revenue increases with θ,
what I have to show is that for any t > 1,
S (tθ¯2, A2) ≥ S (tθ¯1, A1).
As the distribution of the number of layers after an improvement in MT first
order stochastically dominates the one before the management technology im-
proves, I have the following two cases:
T (tθ¯2, A2) = T (tθ¯1, A1)
45
or
T (tθ¯2, A2) > T (tθ¯1, A1).
I discuss these two cases one by one in what follows.
In the case of T (tθ¯2, A2) = T (tθ¯1, A1), if t is small enough such that T (tθ¯2, A2) =
T (tθ¯1, A1) = T0, then it is straightforward to see that
S (tθ¯2, A2) = S (tθ¯1, A1).
For T (tθ¯2, A2) = T (tθ¯1, A1) = T1 > T0, I have
S (tθ¯2, A2) = S (θ¯2, A2)V1(t,T0,T1)
(θ¯2Aσ2 )
2T1
σ+(2T1−1)−
2T0
σ+(2T0−1)
b
(σ−1)(2T1−1)
σ+(2T1−1) −
(σ−1)(2T0−1)
σ+(2T0−1)
2
and
S (tθ¯1, A1) = S (θ¯1, A1)V1(t,T0,T1)
(θ¯1Aσ1 )
2T1
σ+(2T1−1)−
2T0
σ+(2T0−1)
b
(σ−1)(2T1−1)
σ+(2T1−1) −
(σ−1)(2T0−1)
σ+(2T0−1)
1
,
where V1(t,T0,T1) is a function of (t,T0,T1). As S (θ¯2, A2) = S (θ¯1, A1) = f /
[
1−
β(2T0−1)
2T0
]
and
θ¯1
θ¯2
= Aσb(σ−1)(1−
1
2T0
)
Based on Equation (A.5), I conclude that
(A.6)
S (tθ¯2, A2)
S (tθ¯1, A1)
=
[(1
b
)(σ−1)(1− 1
2T0
)
bσ
](σ−1) 2T1−2T0
(σ+2T1−1)(σ+2T0−1)
> 1.
In the case of T (tθ¯2, A2) = T2 > T (tθ¯1, A1) = T1, I prove S (tθ¯2, A2) >
S (tθ¯1, A1) using the result that when the firm optimally chooses to add a layer,
output jumps up discontinuously. Note that
S (tθ¯2, A2,T1)
S (tθ¯1, A1,T1)
≥ 1,
and the equality holds only when T1 = T0 due to Equation (A.6). when the firm
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optimally chooses to add layers, it must be true that
q(tθ¯2, A2,T2) > q(tθ¯2, A2,T1)
and
S (tθ¯2, A2,T2) = A2(tθ¯2)
1
σ q(tθ¯2, A2,T2)β
> S (tθ¯2, A2,T1) = A2(tθ¯2)
1
σ q(tθ¯2, A2,T1)β
> S (tθ¯1, A1,T1).
Thus, S (tθ¯2, A2) must be bigger than or equal to S (tθ¯1, A1) in all possible cases.
Especially, S (tθ¯2, A2) = S (tθ¯1, A1) only when T (tθ¯2, A2) = T (tθ¯1, A1) = T0.
Therefore, the result of the FOSD for the distribution of firms’ revenue follows.
Sixth, I prove the result of FOSD for the distribution of the firms’ output and
employment. Similar to what I have proved above, the goal is to show that for
any t > 1,
q(tθ¯2, A2) ≥ q(tθ¯1, A1).
for all t > 1. First, I prove that when T (θ¯1, A1) = T (θ¯2, A2) = T0,
q(θ¯2, A2,T0) > q(θ¯1, A1,T0).
To see this, note that
TVC(q(θ¯2, A2,T0), b2,T0) =
β(2T0 − 1)
2T0
S (θ¯2, A2,T0)
= TVC(q(θ¯1, A1,T0), b1,T0) =
β(2T0 − 1)
2T0
S (θ¯1, A1,T0),
where
TVC(q,T, b) = (2 − 1
2T−1
)bψ21−
T
2T −1 q
1
2T −1 ,
S (θ¯2, A2,T0) = S (θ¯1, A1,T0) =
f
1 − β(2T0−1)2T0
and
b1 > b2.
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Second, Based on the above result I derive that
q(tθ¯2, A2,T0) = q(θ¯2, A2,T0)t
2T0−1
σ+2T0−1 > q(θ¯1, A1,T0)t
2T0−1
σ+2T0−1 = q(tθ¯1, A1,T0),
if T (tθ¯2, A2) = T (tθ¯1, A1) = T0. Third, if T (tθ¯2, A2) = T (tθ¯1, A1) = T1 > T0, I
have
q(tθ¯2, A2,T1) = q(θ¯2, A2,T0)V2(t,T0,T1)
(A2θ¯ 1σ2
b2
) σ(2T1−1)
σ+(2T1−1)−
σ(2T0−1)
σ+(2T0−1)
and
q(tθ¯1, A1,T1) = q(θ¯1, A1,T0)V2(t,T0,T1)
(A1θ¯ 1σ1
b1
) σ(2T1−1)
σ+(2T1−1)−
σ(2T0−1)
σ+(2T0−1) ,
where V2(t,T0,T1) is a function of (t,T0,T1). Based on equation (A.5), I con-
clude that
q(tθ¯2, A2,T1)
q(tθ¯1, A1,T1)
=
q(θ¯2, A2,T0)
q(θ¯1, A1,T0)
(
b
σ+(2T0−1)
σ2T0
) σ(2T1−1)
σ+(2T1−1)−
σ(2T0−1)
σ+(2T0−1) > 1,
as T1 > T0, b > 1, and q(θ¯2, A2,T0) > q(θ¯1, A1,T0). Fourth, for T (tθ¯2, A2) =
T2 > T (tθ¯1, A1) = T1, I have
q(tθ¯2, A2,T1) > q(tθ¯1, A1,T1)
and
q(tθ¯2, A2,T2) > q(tθ¯2, A2,T1),
where the second inequality comes from the result that when the firm optimally
chooses to add layers output jumps up discontinuously. Therefore, it must be
true that
q(tθ¯2, A2,T2) > q(tθ¯1, A1,T1)
for T2 > T1 as well. This completes the proof for the FOSD result on the
distribution of the firms’ output. Finally, as firms with the same level of output
(i.e., the same number of production workers) have the same employment, the
result of the FOSD holds for the distribution of the firms’ employment as well.
Seventh, I prove that all firms increase the span of control given the number
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of layers when MT improves. First, the span of control is defined as
(A.7) S Ci(T, q(θ, b, A,T (θ, b, A))) =
mi+1(T, q(θ, b, A,T (θ, b, A)))
mi(T, q(θ, b, A,T (θ, b, A)))
,
where (T − 1) ≥ i ≥ 0, and q(θ, b, A,T (θ, b, A)) is the number of production
workers as well as output. Consider a firm with quality draw θ that does not
adjust the number of layers after MT improves. This means
T (θ, b1, A1) = T (θ, b2, A2).
Its output and the number of production workers must increase as26
A2
b2
>
A1
b1
.
The span of control calculated in equation (14) increases with the number of
production workers. Therefore, every surviving firm increases its span of control
at all layers, if it does not adjusted the number of layers.
B Appendix: Selection Effect and the Number of
Layers
In this section, I show that the selection effect disappears, if we ignore the or-
ganizational choice of the firm and interpret the economy-wide improvement in
MT as a proportional upward shift of firms’ demand draws in Melitz (2003).
Specifically, suppose every demand draw increases from θ to (b1θ)/b2 where
b1 > b2. This is equivalent to moving the distribution of θ from
G(θ) = 1 −
(
θmin
θ
)k
to
G(θ) = 1 −
( b1
b2
θmin
θ
)k
,
where productivity-enhancing MT improves from 1/b1 to 1/b2. Equation (29)
shows that the exit cutoff increases by the same proportion (i.e., b1/b2), and rel-
26For detailed proof of this result, see Appendix A.D.
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ative profit (and sales) of two firms with different demand draws is unchanged:
pi(θ1)
pi(θ2)
=
pi
(
b1
b2
θ1
)
pi
(
b1
b2
θ2
) = θ1
θ2
.
Therefore, modeling an improvement in MT in such a reduced-form way does
not generate the selection effect.
An alternative benchmark model for heterogeneous firms is Melitz and Ot-
taviano (2008). We show that the selection effect of improved MT is reversed
(i.e., favoring small and less hierarchical firms), if we interpret the economy-
wide improvement in MT as a proportional downward shift of firms’ cost draws
in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). Suppose the cost draw of every firm changes
from c to (b2c)/b1 where b1 > b2, when MT improves. As a result, the CDF of
the cost draw becomes27
G(c) =
(
c
b2
b1
cM
)k
.
After this change, the exit cutoff changes from cD(b1) to cD(b2) = (b2/b1)k/(k+2)cD(b1) >
(b2/b1)cD(b1), where cD(bi) is the exit cutoff when the management quality is
1/bi (see equation (15) of Melitz and Ottaviano 2008). Therefore, the exit cut-
off on the cost draw goes down by less than b2/b1 (i.e., less stringent selection
after MT improves), and relative profit of two firms with different cost draws
(c1 > c2) equals
pi(c1)
pi(c2)
=
(cD(b1) − c1)2
(cD(b1) − c2)2
before the improvement of the MT and
pi
(
b2
b1
c1
)
pi
(
b2
b1
c2
) =
(
cD(b2) − b2b1 c1
)2
(
cD(b2) − b2b1 c2
)2
after the improvement. As cD(b2) > (b2/b1)cD(b1), less efficient firms gain more
from such a proportional downward shift in the cost draw:
pi
(
b2
b1
c1
)
pi
(
b2
b1
c2
) > pi(c1)
pi(c2)
.
27See equation (14) of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008).
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In other words, smaller and less hierarchical firms survive and gain market
shares (relative to more hierarchical firms) after MT improves, which leads to
a selection effect favoring small firms. This result is related to the difference in
markups between firms. A downward shift in the cost draw increases profit of
all firms. Importantly, as more efficient firms charge higher markups, this pro-
portional downward shift in the cost draw increases the profit of less efficient
firms disproportionately. Therefore, the selection effect favoring more hierar-
chical firms is reversed in this case. In total, the selection effect favoring big
firms cannot be generated, if we do not model the firm’s hierarchical choices
explicitly.
C Appendix: No Adjustment in the Number of Lay-
ers
In this section, we show that the selection effect (i.e., the increase in the exit
cutoff after MT improves) still exists, if firms can choose the number of layers
optimally before MT improves but cannot change it after MT improves. In
short, the proof for this result resembles Appendix A.D, and we prove it using
the following three steps. First, using the same logic as in Appendix A.D, we
can show that
1 >
A2
A1
>
b2
b1
,
where 1/b1 and A1 are management quality and adjusted market size before MT
improves, while 1/b2 and A2 are management quality and adjusted market size
after MT improves. Next, to the contrary, we assume that there is no selection
effect when there is no adjustment in the number of layers after MT improves.
This means that the exit cutoff θ¯ either decreases or stays unchanged when MT
improves which implies that
(C.1) pi(θ¯,T0, A2, b2) ≥ pi(θ¯,T0, A1, b1),
where T0 + 1 is the number of layers chosen by firms on the exit cutoff before
MT improves, and subscript 1 (and 2) denotes the variable before (and after)
MT improves. Following the same steps used in Appendix A.D, we can show
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that
b(σ−1)(2
T0−1)(
1
A
)2T0σ ≥ 1,
where A(< 1) and b(> 1) are defined in the same way as in appendix A.D.
Furthermore, the above inequality implies that for all other firms whose number
of layers (T + 1) is bigger than or equal to T0 + 1 we also have
b(σ−1)(2
T−1)(
1
A
)2Tσ > 1,
which implies that
(C.2) pi(θ,T, A2, b2) > pi(θ,T, A1, b1),
where T ≥ T0 and θ ≥ θ¯. Equations (C.1), (C.2) and the assumption that the
exit cutoff does not increase (after MT improves) together imply that the free
entry condition is violated. Therefore, the exit cutoff θ¯ must go up when MT
improves for all firms. As a result, firms with the worst demand draws exit the
market, and resources are reallocated to firms with the best demand draws. 
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